Brazil is one of the countries that arereceiving the most of global attention politically, economically, and socially in the early 21st century. Brazil, a country with persistent and chronic gap between rich and poor, has shown a tendency of reducing the rate of poor strata by recent social indicators while the middle class is expanding. With the expansion of the industrial production and exports Brazil became the 6th world economy in 2011.
Particularly, during the tenure of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (2003-2010), Brazil demonstrated aprominent move in foreign policy. Brazil advanced beyond the regional leadership showed in the founding process of the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) to show leadership in the entire South American region with the establishment of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Brazil also started to get the spotlight in the multilateral stage by organizing the developing-country group of G20+ within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations as well as campaigning for her permanent seat on the UN Security Council. In addition, Brazil has been participating in the G-20 summit meetings of major 20 countries established after global financial crisis. Also, Brazil selected strategic partner countries and established alliances with India and South Africa to form IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa), and developedBRICs into a board of representatives with other emerging industrial countries such as Russia, India, China. That is to say that with the emergence of its economy, Brazil has demonstrated a very aggressive foreign policy on issues of international situation and trade.
This report attempts to call this active foreign policy, based on Brazil’s recent economic emergence, a ‘Power Diplomacy’ and by analyzing the nature of this power diplomacy draw the implications for Korea-Brazil relations on four points.
First, Brazilian scholars generally describe the process of Brazil’s foreign policy development as having moved from ‘autonomy by distance’ to ‘autonomy by participation’ and to ‘autonomy by diversification’. In other words, Brazil kept distance from international affairs and gradually broadened its participation, and recently has been pursuing multipolarization to exercise its leadership. Particularly, Brazil tookthe opportunity of the United States’ invasion of Iraq in March 2003, when world major countries had conflicted interests, and in September of the same year Brazil formed the G3 (Group of 3) with India and China in WTO Cancun meeting and gathereddeveloping countries against the United States and European Union’s more than US$300 billion annual agricultural subsidies to form the G20+. Thereafter, Brazil has made its position clear about international security and trade issues and has been actively involved.
Brazilianpower diplomacy’s mid-term goal seems to be the acquisition of the UN Security Council permanent member position. Brazil has been participated in various United Nations peace-keeping missions in Africa (Angola, Uganda, Rwanda, Liberia, Mozambique, and South Africa), Europe (the former Yugoslavia), Asia (Cambodia and East Timor), and Latin America (El Salvador and Guatemala). In particular, Brazil sent 1,200 peace-keeping troops to Haiti in 2004 as the representative of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to fulfill the role of ‘nation-building’, going beyond a mere peace-keeping action.
Brazil also hoped to play the role of coordinating the position of the international community regarding the problem of the Korean peninsula. Under Lula’s presidency, a simultaneous presidential visit to North and South Koreaswas studied. Brazil took an independent and neutral stance about the results of the investigations of the sinking of the South Korean navy frigate Cheonan in 2010. As long as the Brazilian Workers Party (PT) continues to rule, the Brazilian government seems to hold on to its own foreign policy line in terms of international security policy, particularly independent fromthe United States. Therefore, Korean government cannot take as granted Brazil’s unconditional support as given during the Cold war era, but should pay attention to the nature of the Brazil’s new Power Diplomacy strategy and try to extend the political consensus with Brazil as a non-hegemonic developing power.
Second, in terms of trade policy, Brazil has taken an aggressive stance regarding the opening of agriculture and bio-energy markets due to its international competitiveness in these sectors which guarantees net profit. This means that, especially under the PT government, the priority is given to foster strategic industries rather than the 1990s trade policy of opening domestic markets. Thus, for the establishment and implementation of such trade policy, the Brazilian government and the ruling party addressed special considerations towards the domestic industrial policy, and attended the opinions of civil society and the industrial sector. These practical interests pursued by Brazilian trade policy is not based on comparative advantage theory, but rather operate as a way of supporting national industrial policy, and partiallymeans a return to the policy line before the market opening of the 1990s. That is why Brazil’s trade policy tends to focus on some industrial sectors and products.
This was very well demonstrated by the Brazilian passive attitude in the negotiations of the Free Trade Area of ​​he Americas (FTAA) and anFTA with the EU where profit was not guaranteed, whereas Brazil took a hard stand in the WTO DDA negotiations. In FTAA, the Brazilian strategy was to interrupt or scuttle the negotiations unless ensured of entering the market of its agricultural sector. The FTA negotiations with the EU would strike a balance depending on the progress in the negotiations with the United States. In the WTO negotiations, the strategy was to make the negotiations be led by agriculture exporting countries. The FTAA eventually failed at the Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata in 2005, and the negotiations with the EU are still stalled, while in the WTO-DDA negotiations, the exercise of the Brazil’s leadership is being noticed. Whether in the WTO negotiations or in the FTAA and EU negotiations, when the ‘market access’ is not secured for sectors such as agriculture which Brazil has a clear comparative advantage, Brazil uses passive, delaying and exhaustive negotiation strategy.
Over the past few years, Korea has been promoting FTA with the MERCOSUR, a customs union that Brazil is a part of. Brazil declines to even use the term ‘free trade’ as it has negative connotations in Brazil. Whereas Brazilian manufacturing industry is opposed to the FTA with South Korea, Korea would not attempt to fully open its markets to Brazilian agricultural and livestock products. Brazil does not rush into promoting negotiations when the market access for its national products is not guaranteed, and goes into ‘prolonged negotiation strategy’. Thus, the Korea-MERCOSUR FTA diplomacy may be a waste of time until the agricultural and livestock market access is revolved as a prerequisite. On the other hand, however, it should be noted that Brazil partially returns to trade protectionism to implement its new industrial policy. It may beadvisable that Korea also make use of two-pronged strategy, examining complaints over Brazil through the WTO, while more proactively strengthening the cooperation in the industrial technology area that Brazil needs. In other words, the Korean government may cooperate by establishing a technical school in coordination with Korean companies who already settled locally or an industrial technology center for the expansion in Brazil of small and medium Korean enterprises with technological prowess, or through the R&D cooperation utilizing a bilateral industrial cooperation fund to build a mutual win-win collaborative model that can build trust and consensus between the two countries, and then obstacles in trade could be gradually resolved.
Third, the Brazilian government, perceiving that Brazil and the U.S. produce 80 percent of the world’s ethanol, signed the bilateral technical cooperation treaty upon the production of bio-fuels in March 2007. This was not only to reduce oil consumption by increasing the use of alternative energy sources such as ethanol and prepare for future energy shortages following the ‘energy security policy’, but also to maintain the Brazilian leadership in South America attempting to restrain Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who was expanding his regional influence making use of the vast oil resources. On the other hand, the Brazilian government has actively tried to form a sugarcane-based ethanol world market through a stable supply network. Brazil has made effortsto make Brazilian sugarcane technology and related facilities as the international standard. For this reason, the Brazilian government is promoting technology transfer cooperation with countries that can cultivate sugarcane such as Mexico, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Panama in the region, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Mozambique, Angola, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal in Africa, and the Philippines, Australia, India, China, Vietnam in Asia-Pacific, etc. An enthusiastic response from countries around the world and the gradual supply of sugarcane ethanol in the future may affect Korea as well. Especially, given that the sugarcane has originally been cultivated in Southeast Asia, some countries in this region such as India, Thailand, Bangladesh, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, etc. may build a new axis in the green energy era.
Korea will need to approach this issue comprehensively with trade policy. In other words, considering that Brazil’s manufacturing sector is mostly defensive, Brazilian offensive in energy and agricultural sectors does not seem to be hard to cope with by the Korean diplomacy. While securing ethanol also is an important policy agenda for Korea in terms of energy security, the Korean government should strengthen the cooperation on ethanol industry with the Brazilian government and find an opportunity towards a major step forward the cooperation in the trade sector and create a mutual win-win model. The specific means of cooperation on ethanol industry will be the assistance on the construction of R&D centers related to ethanol, and the relevant technology exchanges through technical development agreements.
Fourth, Brazil’s currency, the ‘real’, has been strong since President Lula took office. In January 2003, the exchange rate was 3.53 real per dollar, and since then the downward tendency of dollar continued and in the 2nd administration of Lula, it passed the 2.00 real in April 2007. Following the October 2008 global financial crisis, it continued to surpass overall 2.00 real and remained at 1.85 real in late 2011. The real has been appreciated almost 50 percent in nineyears since Lula’s administration until the first year of Dilma Rousseff’s administration. To a country that wants to take off into stable economic growth, the appreciation of real added to the already high interest rates world-wide to cause the weakening of price competitiveness of Brazilian products. The Brazilian government has criticized the major countries’ monetary policy to intentionally encourage currency depreciation in the context of the global financial crisis by labeling it as “currency war”.
Brazil’s hard-line position on the international monetary order is basically aimed at major countries such as the United States or China, but in the long run, it can imply a comprehensive offensive against countries that often intervene on the foreign exchange market like Korea. On the other hand, Brazil’s position may easilychange and its arguments can become dull depending on the international macro-economic conditions. Brazil’s Central Bank made the decision to sell US$2,75 billion on September 22, 2011 to prevent the real’s depreciation. This decision was taken as a countermeasure due to concerns about the inflation shockamid the persistence of economic insecurity in Europe and the U.S in September 2011, when investors fled from emerging markets toward risk-free assets such as in the U.S. treasury bonds, and the real declined 17% against the U.S. dollar, a phenomena not seen over the previous two years.
It cannot be overemphasized that Korea should pursue a monetary policy based on market principles as it pursues a dynamic market economy. Thus, the Brazil’s assertion about the “currency war” and its criticism of the countries that manipulate exchange rate should be properly supported. However, one should also note the contradiction of Brazilian policy management. Brazil’s aggressive positionsabout the currency war and its new industrial policy focus on the competitiveness of Brazilian export products. But in their background, there is the conflicting logic of ‘market’ principles, in the currency war offensive, and the strengthening of the role of the ‘state’ in the industrial policy.
In conclusion, in the context of its domestic political and economic stability, Brazil has consolidated its political and economic regional cooperation and multilateral diplomacy, a long-term cooperation with strategic partner countries, an offensive foreign trade policy in the energy and agriculture sectors, and an aggressive posture in international monetary policy, while developing a Power Diplomacy which is different from its past ones. Brazil’s power diplomacy has direct and indirect impacts on Korea, and is likely to continue in the future. In responding to this and attempting to build a sustainable relationship with Brazil, Korea will need to consider the fact that both countries are under external influences as middle-powers. Indentifying and recognizing their common grounds should be the starting point toward pursuing and safeguarding national interests. This will help extend the mutual sympathy and expand the room for cooperation.
The core of Brazilian power diplomacy lies upon South-South cooperation. Not only its independent diplomacy in relation to the US foreign policy but also its strategic initiatives toward developing nations and emerging economic nations all are promoted within the framework of South-South cooperation. Its South-South cooperation intends to set up a strategic partnership with major countries by regions. It is doubtful that China is this kind of South-South cooperation partner for Brazil in Asia. This partnership may be effective to hold back the U.S. unilateralism, but in trade and international financial agenda, it may not. China as the member of the G2 rather brings about the new bipolar system, presenting clear limitations as Brazil’s strategic partner. Korea may be an appropriate alternative instead.
It should be advised that Korea utilize strategically the mechanism of South-South cooperation to expand the cooperation with Brazil. The expansion of room for cooperation is feasible starting from the shared values. It is not easy for Korea to find common values with Brazil in the issues of international security, international trade, and international financial areas. For in all these respects, Korea and Brazil tend to have different interests and circumstances. Yet it is a strong legend that both countries have overcome the economic and social structure of the colonial period and achieved economic and social development, which can be a common value both should hold on. Korea’s strategy that most effectively can respond to Brazilian power diplomacy has to part from the effort to extend and reproduce the common value between Korea and Brazil, bilaterally and cross-regionally. One of the most urgent and feasible products may be the cooperation in the areas of human capital and technological development.

This study aims to introduce a preliminary research for Korea’s approach to Venezuelan oil sands, which will further provide feasible and practical policy measures. Korea’s expansion strategies, particularly, in conjunction with the current policy changes in Venezuela related to the energy industry were primarily analyzed. In fact, there are a number of obstacles and challenges that prevent Korea from easily advancing into oil sands in that the institutional and operational framework to run energy policies tends to be exclusive, and the strengthening of resource nationalism in the country still remains as a huge barrier.

However, at this present moment of 2011, changing and renovating energy policies as well as the institutional framework is an ongoing process, which signifies the gradual opening of the market. The first sign for this opening can be found in Chavez’s political agenda that domestically emphasizes resource naturalism with left-wing ideology while internationally maintains strong antagonism toward the Unites States. Anti-american foreign policy is one of the Chavez’s core foreign policies, enabling him to befriend and develop a closer relationship with Rusia, China, Iran, Iraq, and Cuba. Spontaneously, other countries are also allowed to participate in the development of the oil sector, resulting in a sort of the ballon effect.
The second reason depends on an economic factor that Venezuela lacks financial capital and technology. Chavez’s anti-american foreign policy basically has frozen the capital inflow and the technological support from the Unites States to develop oil sands. Although this decline has not severely affected Venezuela thanks to the rise of international oil prices and chinese investment, the problem of financial and technological shortage requires a long-term solution and strategy. From this perspective, Korea’s advanced technology of infrastructure development can offer a valuable opportunity for the country to advance into Venezuelan oil sands.
Thirdly, it must be considered the environmental security issue. The work of oil-producing generates serious environmental contamination for along time, including with oil sand product as well. In this regard, it is a great opportunity to approach Korea’s eco-innovation technology in the process of oil-sand product in Venezuela. The high technology of Korea and know-hows in Canada's experience will help to reduce contamination and make more secure development process.
This study came to a tentative conclusion that Korea is more apt to develop a long-term strategy and invest in the downstream sectors of the oil industry than to participate in the current development plan for Venezuelan oil sands. This is mainly because Korea has a high international competitiveness in the construction of infrastructure in relation to the refining, transportation, and sale process. Further and finally, Korea make great efforts with multi-level approaches, such as the sharing of korean development experience, infra-development and cooperation, enforcing of human network through diplomatic method, including reinforcement of socio-cultural interchange between Venezuela and Korea.

Today, the Brazilian economy is the seventh largest by purchasing power parity and the one of the world's fastest growing major economies. Korean government and enterprise make every effort to utilize the ‘Brazil Chance’. But our governments and private companies did't had informations about brazilian government organizations and functions. So that, the goal of this research is to propose alternatives to improve relationships of Korea and Brazil in intergovernmental relations (IGR). First, despite the absence of political reform, or any other change in the political institutions, Brazil turns centralized federalism into decentralized federalism in process of democratization. Second, Brazil have a multi-dimentional structure of federal, state and municipal in accordance with government organization law. Third, Dilma’administration try to cooperate with local government for sustainable development with measures of regional inequality, poverty reduction and Growth Acceleration Program (PAC). Fourth, Brazilian public procurement policies apply to purchases by government entities and state-owned companies. By Brazilian law, central and local government may not make a distinction between domestic and foreign companies during the tendering process.

In the last century, Latin American has been known for its explosive population growth. However, nowadays, the population growth rate has declined to the level where many Latin American countries such as Brazil and Mexico needs to worry its consequences. i.e. the ageing of population. Such demographic transition in Latin American not only means changes in its demographic structure but also will lead to some fundamental changes in the society. Therefore, it is critical to analyze Latin American demographic transition and possible challenges and responses posed by the transition. This study aims at analyzing demographic transition in Latin America. It consists of 5 chapter. The chapter 1 is a brief introduction to the research. The chapter 2 reviews the history of Latin American demographic transiton and its consequences. Also this chapter overviews the population structure of Latin America and its particularities. The chapter 3 discusses the changes in fertility and mortality. After providing the general picture of transformation in ferility and mortality in Latin America, this chapter analyzes some demographically important countries. In the chapter 4, migration, another important variable to determine changes in population, was discussed. Considering the fact that Latin America has the largest number of people emigrate to other parts of the world, migration has some meaningful effects on population transition. The chapter 5 discusses consequences of such changes in Latin American population structure in women’s participation in labor market as well as the growing elderly population. Also this chapter analyzes policy responses of Latin American countries to the demographic challenges. Finally in the conclusion, possible implications of demographic transition to Korean society.

Latin America not only possess abundant petroleum and natural gas but also holds key mineral resources, such as iron, copper, zinc, bauxite, lithium, and etc. Starting with Venezuela, the largest oil-producing country in the region, most of the Latin American countries including Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador, have natural gas as well as metal and mineral resources.
As Latin America has emerged as a core target area to secure natural resources, both public and private investment in this region has been simultaneously increasing. Nevertheless, understanding the genuine nature of investment and relative legislation, which could create de facto benefits from investing activities and vitalize them, is still inadequate. This tendency derives mostly from the fact that previously-conducted researches would emphasize the acquisition of the general political, economic, societal, and cultural aspects of the targeted country. Based upon these antecedent studies, it is now essential to conduct an in-dept analysis of the legal framework for resource development in the Latin American region.
This study, in this context, aims to examine the composition and contents of various laws on resource development, focusing on three Latin American countries (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador) that have high richness of natural resources.
A radical transformation in South American politics as of 2000 has brought about consequent changes in its business environment and resource-related legislation. This, in fact, signifies that unclear understanding of this ever-changing legal system can cause hardship to successful trade and investment.
By undertaking this research on analyzing the legal system that could guarantee a safety net for the future investors, this study is expected to improve the current condition of the passive investment in three countries due to high investment risk in despite of increasing interest in their resources. This study further seeks to provide guidelines for the government and private companies, which promote to branch out into various resource development projects in these countries, to establish profound investment strategies.
Venezuela, the number one oil-producing country in Latin America as well as the holder of rich natural gas, carried out a resource nationalism after Hugo Chávez came to power. Ever since, both domestic and foreign investment environments have confronted radical changes, and related laws and regulations have also turned into a new system. Venezuela still maintains its strong resource nationalism that ensures state's full ownership over country's natural resources legitimatized by the Hydrocarbon Law, enacted in 2001, and the Mining Law, enacted in 1999.
In the case of Bolivia, within the wave of political changes based on civil society since 2000, several political incidents, such as the enactment of the new Hydrocarbon Law in 2005, the emergence of Evo Morales, the first indigenous president in national history, in 2006, and the proclamation of the new Constitution in 2009, have accelerated the transformations of legal framework for the country. Regardless of international criticism of the Bolivia's enlargement of market obstructiveness built on resource nationalism, the country still has adhered to the direction of a state-oriented resource development.
Likewise, Ecuador, which has proven the sixth-largest natural gas reserves and the third-largest oil reserves in South America, has strengthen its resource nationalism on the basis of national sovereignty on natural resources since inauguration of Rafael Correa in 2007. Ecuador's new Mining Law of 2009 and the new Hydrocarbon Law of 2010 recognized nation's non-renewable natural resources (hydrocarbons and minerals) as a national strategic target, and elevated correspondingly state's control over them.
All three countries currently are not favorable to foreign investors in their resource development. Although the Investment Law of each country clearly indicates no sign of legislative discrimination against them, the actual laws in effect, such as the Hydrocarbon Law and the Mining Law, permits solely the state-owned companies to participate in the resource development activities.
It is, consequently, important to reduce investment risk that any of private investors or companies could face by means of achieving leading actions at the national level including inter-government agreements or joint-projects on resource development.

 In this report we provide in depth information on the anthropological study carried out and the distribution of Latin American immigrants and their experiences in Korea. Our research methods include a survey, interview, and participant observation carried out between June and November 2011. Data were gathered with the aim of finding ways for immigrants to develop social networks and to make better adjustments to life in Korea, and furthermore, to make suggestions for institutional aid and programs for immigrants.
This report consists of 6 chapters including the conclusion. Chapters 1 and 2 respectively provide general statistics on Latin American immigrants in Korea and characteristics of their immigration processes. Chapter 3 <The Process of Migration and Sociocultural Relations of Latin American Immigrants> comparatively examines the Japanese case and the Korean case of Latin American immigration. Through this comparison, the study clearly reveals the nature, meanings and impacts of Latin American immigration to Korea and sheds light on the importance of sociocultural factors for understanding the history of immigration, immigration processes, and immigrants' social adjustment in addition to economic factors. Chapter 4 <Latin American Expats' Sociocultural Adjustment in Korea> deals with the ways in which Latin American expats select adjustment strategies. While previous social scientific studies have tended to rely on quantitative analysis of expats' psychological adjustment and to deploy overgeneralized notions of sociocultural adjustment, this study utilizes qualitative methodology in order to pay more attention to the specifics of Latin American expats' experiences in Korea. The result of this study shows that Latin American expats in Korea select from among various strategies to adjust to Korean culture, depending on the nature of their job and where they live. Chapter 5 <An Analysis of Immigration Experience and Immigration Network according to status of sojourn> examined network formation and how it is used, and immigrants' experiences according to their status of sojourn. The result of this study shows that Latin American immigrants utilize different kinds of network and this tendency is visible in the process of immigration to Korea. In addition, Latin American immigration to Korea is characterized in this study as a family-based strategy rather than an individual strategy.
In conclusion, having conducted research on Latin American immigrants from various countries and of various visa types in Korea, we reached an understanding of some of the characteristics of Latin Americans' immigration process in Korea, sociocultural adjustment strategies, and sociocultural relations in Korea. This study contributes to an understanding of Latin American immigrants' statuses and roles in Korea, and aids in predicting their future path in Korea society. We suggest that it is necessary to improve qualitative aspects of immigrants' lives rather than to simply increase the number of immigrants in Korea; we also recommend that the Korean government develop policies to facilitate immigrants' positive experience of the overall process of immigration.

To design the cooperation strategy between Korea and Latin America, it is necessary to analyze the sectoral level of technological development of each Latin American country. However, as there is no universally accepted measure of technological development by sector, we adopted several indicators for the measurement, such as: number of BA/MA/Doctoral degrees awarded each year, R&D expenditure, publication of articles registered in SCOPUS, patents registered in US Patent and Trademark Office and the major companies which registered those patents, and Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) index.
The results of the analysis show that most Latin American countries have relatively high level of technological development in the areas of agriculture, biology, chemistry related science and technologies, and low level of development in electronics and computer related ones. However, Brazil and Mexico showed relatively high level of technological development in the areas of machinery and energy.
By purpose of cooperation, technological cooperation was divided into diplomatic cooperation purpose, joint research purpose, development cooperation and technology transfer purpose. By form of cooperation, it was divided into resources exchange cooperation, bridgehead securing cooperation, and base research cooperation.
With Brazil, which has a very high level of technological development in some areas, the main purpose of cooperation may be diplomatic purpose as well as joint research, and the areas of cooperation may be agriculture, energy, and aerospace. With Mexico, the cooperation in the areas of energy and machinery seems to be promising. With Argentina, Colombia, Chile, and Peru, cooperation in the areas of biology, marine issues, and mineral resources is recommended. As for other countries with lower income, the cooperation may be more for the purpose of development cooperation and technology transfer in the areas of agriculture, food processing, and clothing sectors.